


THE WAR OF 1870

THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF LORRAINE AND ALSACE.

THE consolidation of many distinct States into a few great nations has been the gradual work of the last half a dozen centuries of European history ; and the process, it is well known, is still incomplete. It was one of the mischievous results of the feudal system, that it gave rise to an extreme multiplication of fiefs of various kinds, and nearly all independent of one another. Every feudatory laid claim to some of the attributes of sovereignty. Each higher grade had a more extensive jurisdiction : until, when we reach the grand dukes, marquises, and earls, we find them to have been at one time kings in all but the name. Germany has longest retained traces of this minute subdivision, but France was once in about the same condition. In Ger-

many, however, the Imperial dignity being theoretically elective, and, in point of fact, passing from one princely family to another, the association of that dignity with any particular house did not secure to it an undisputed predominance, nor lead to tightening the bands which united the members of the loosely-framed organism. But it was otherwise in France. Originally, when Hugh Capet, the heir to the duchy of France,—a limited territory in the heart of the country,—was elected to fill the throne of Charlemagne, there were no less than seven fiefs of such importance that any one of them rivalled in power that with which the crown was now combined. Upon these depended a large number of very considerable duchies and





LORRAINE AND ALSACE.

counties. Below came the viscounts and barons; still lower, the holders of single castles; and, last of all, the peasants and serfs, the only industrious and producing classes, who formed the foundation of this singular pyramid, and by their despised but useful labors sustained in idleness all the successive grades of the privileged classes.

It took the French kings about five centuries to bring this heterogeneous mass into

some degree of order, and to realize the conception of a single country. Much injustice was incidentally done, and in the process many franchises were lost and a strong despotism established. Yet almost anything was preferable to the incessant discord and warfare of petty barons, who, while powerless for good, were yet sufficiently strong to obstruct commerce by the imposition of exorbitant tolls and customs, if not by plundering travelers, or imprisoning them with a view to the exaction of a heavy ransom.

Even when, as the result of his successful contest with Charles the Bold, Louis XI. had, by the incorporation of Burgundy, given to France something approaching its natural boundaries, France, although it stretched from the ocean to the Alps and the Mediterranean, only touched the Pyrenees at certain points separated from each other by a number of minor States

(Béarn, Foix, etc.), while in the opposite direction the north-easterly boundary scarcely reached the river Meuse. Not to speak of the Comtat Venaissin (the Pope's domain around Avignon), and the principality of Orange, which this in turn almost surrounded, the Duke of Savoy held the district of *Bresse*, stretching far to the west of Geneva, and coming so near to Lyons as to make it a border town. And north of this a large

triangle, made up of Franche-Comté, Lorraine, and Alsace, was equally foreign territory. This triangle comprised the district now apportioned among *nine* of the eighty-six departments into which France is divided, or about one-tenth of its entire area.

It may well be imagined that it was not long before the eyes of the French monarchs were turned covetously in the directions where their boundaries were so manifestly inconvenient and unnatural. The foreign possessions at the foot of the Pyrenees gave Spain a safe approach into the valley of the Garonne: Bresse, in Savoy's hand, was a perpetual menace directed against the large city to whose gates it extended. Avignon, completely encased in French territory, was harmless. But the three provinces which brought Germany to the very border of Champagne were a prize for which there could not but arise a struggle before long.

The peculiar features of the political geography of Lorraine undoubtedly facilitated the designs which the French monarchs formed against it, and made it the first to be assailed. The same peculiarities, also, perhaps saved it from at once falling entirely into their hands. This fertile territory, measuring about one hundred and twenty miles in length from north to south, by one hundred from east to west, according to Count d'Haussonville, the most recent historian of the union of the province to France, was divided into five principal parts—Lorraine proper, Vosges, German Lorraine, Barrois *mouvant* (that is, under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Paris), and Barrois *non-mouvant* (or subject to the sovereign court of Lorraine). It was further broken up by fiefs of the French king and of the German empire.

And lastly, it was split into a number of separate fragments by the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, whose spiritual heads had succeeded in asserting their sway over a very considerable extent of country, as rich and populous as any in the land. It was the unprotected situation of these bishoprics that served as the occasion for extending the domain and influence of France in the direction of the Rhine.

VOL. I.—24

SURPRISE OF THE "THREE BISHOPRICS."

Maurice of Saxony had, in 1551, become disgusted with the service of the Emperor Charles the Fifth. Especially was he vexed that his master should turn a deaf ear to all his entreaties for the liberation of his father-in-law, the Landgrave of Hesse, from the confinement to which he had been consigned five years before. The ambitious commander-in-chief of Charles's troops resolved therefore to turn not only his own sword, but the arms of his victorious followers, against the Emperor. But before executing his crafty design, he associated with himself other Protestant princes of the Empire, among whom may be particularly mentioned the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg, and applied for support to Henry the Second, king of France. This monarch was only too glad to embrace the opportunity of striking a blow under such favorable circumstances at the prince who for many years had been the successful rival of his father, and who, not content with having himself enjoyed the imperial dignity, was planning to secure the succession to his son Philip. A secret treaty was therefore readily concluded. Henry, in addition to furnishing a large sum of money to his confederates, was himself to take the field as the "Protector of the liberties of the Holy Empire."

Before the affair came to actual blows, there was the ordinary profusion of wordy proclamations containing truth and fiction combined in about the customary proportions. Henry in particular took care to justify himself in the eyes of the world. He boasted that he had nothing more at heart, after the establishment of religion, than the security of the public tranquillity, and recounted at some length the measures which he had taken to confirm it at home and abroad. Next the aggressive measures of the Emperor were passed in review, especially his instigation of the Duchess dowager of Lorraine to refuse to do him homage for the duchy of Bar, "which was beyond all dispute a fief of his crown." But besides these personal injuries, Henry professed himself deeply moved with sympathy for the German princes, now menaced in their dearest liberties: and in making with them an alli-

ance, which was only a renewal of the old league between the two nations, he "took God to witness, that all the fruit which he expected from the war was to restore Germany to her ancient dignity, to deliver John Frederick of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse from their long and unjust captivity, and thereby to give a new proof of the regard which he had for the ancient union subsisting between the kings of France and the princes of Germany. This would be the true means of rendering it more close, by freeing these people from the yoke that was being placed on their necks."

The "very Christian king," having thus demonstrated his perfect disinterestedness to the entire satisfaction of all who desired to credit his professions, made his preparations for the campaign, not omitting to conciliate the favor of Heaven upon his compact with the Protestants of Germany, by devoutly "visiting the relics and monuments of St. Denis, St. Eleuthère, and St. Rustique, apostles of France." Perhaps, however, he relied more, in his endeavor to remove the embarrassing inconsistency of his course, and to attest the immaculate orthodoxy of his sentiments, upon the fact that before leaving he made his appearance in Parliament with great pomp, and strenuously urged that august body to redouble its severity in the persecution of the French heretics. As the judges had for many years been consigning the bodies of the Protestants to the flames in the "estrapade," and confiscating their property, it may be thought that the injunction was intended rather to display the king's own zeal, than for any practical aggravation of punishment.

With a powerful army, and preceded by Constable Montmorency, his trusted general, Henry marched from Paris early in the spring of 1552 to Chalons, thence to Vitry and Joinville. Here, upon the borders of Lorraine, he received a visit from the Duchess Dowager, who came (it was presumed a little reluctantly, and only because the support of her uncle, the Emperor, was too distant to help her) to place her lands and those of her son, the Duke, under the King's protection. Henry accepted her apologies, and expressed the intention of assigning the young Duke a residence in France with his son the Dauphin,

and of later concluding a more firm alliance. On receiving tidings of the King's approach, the magistrates and inhabitants of Toul and Metz had taken in the full danger that awaited their independence. The former city, however, was too feeble to hope to withstand so large a force, and the municipal authorities without hesitation came out to meet the King and offer him the keys. Among the inhabitants there was every mark of joy. Indeed, so great a crowd was gathered to greet him, that Henry, avoiding the gate at which he was expected, and where the royal canopy was in readiness, made the circuit of the walls, and entered elsewhere through a crowd which was scarcely smaller than that which he sought to shun. In full armor, accompanied by a martial company of princes and lords, and preceded by a goodly array of "heralds-at-arms, clothed in their habits of crimson and azure velvet sprinkled with fleurs-de-lys," and proclaiming his approach by sound of trumpet and clarion, Henry rode to the portal of the cathedral. Here, in the presence of the assembled clergy and people, in their richest attire, the monarch took a solemn oath to maintain the city in all its rights and liberties, and then entered the church and listened to the joyful *Te Deum* raised in honor of his advent.

Leaving a garrison in Toul, Henry took the road by Nancy, the capital of Lorraine, and Pont-à-Mousson to Metz. Constable Montmorency had preceded him, and had demanded free passage for the King, such as had been accorded in time past to the Emperor. The prudent magistrates, who had gradually acquired a dominant position in the city to the detriment of the episcopal authority, were unwilling to accede to the summons. As an independent and neutral city, they said, Metz could do no more with safety than permit the King and the constable, with a small retinue of nobles, to enter and receive the hospitalities which they were ready to accord them. But Montmorency was a man of few words and rough manners, and his threat to turn his cannon against the walls had a wholesome effect. Besides, if we may credit the chronicler, who himself served in the army, the people were less reluctant

than their superiors to see the rule of the French. Oppressed and robbed by the extortions of the *seigneurs*, they were ready to welcome any change that would free them of their tyrannical masters. It was, therefore, at length concluded that the Constable, with a number of princes and gentlemen, and with two ensigns of infantry, should be admitted to Metz. The arrangement, it must be admitted, was not carried into effect according to the understanding of the citizens. The two ensigns, which should together have consisted of only six hundred men, were made twice as strong, and the Constable's escort numbered no less than fifteen hundred men. Detecting the fraud when a part of the body had entered their city, the inhabitants of Metz attempted to close the gate against the rest; but it was too late. Those that were within opened to those who remained without. "Thus it was," observes the chronicler, "that this puissant city, after having reigned from time immemorial in all loftiness and presumptuous pride, was in a little while surprised and reduced to the obedience of the King, on that Sunday on which we commemorate the entry of Jesus Christ into that of Jerusalem, which was the tenth day of April, 1552."

Meantime Henry, after sending off the young Duke of Lorraine, in spite of the tears of his mother, under the escort of a company of men-at-arms, and almost as a captive, to the city of Rheims, where the young princes of France were then residing, advanced to Metz, which he reached on the 18th of April. Never had the city witnessed so magnificent an entry. Almost every great noble of France was present, and the Romish Church was represented by no less than three French cardinals dressed in their red robes, each a person deserving more than a passing notice:—the Cardinal of Lorraine, the bloody persecutor; the Cardinal of Châtillon, Coligny's elder brother, and one day to become himself a Protestant; and the Cardinal of Lenoncourt, who was also Archbishop of Metz. Here, again, the King first alighted in front of the great church of St. Stephen, where, with his right hand upon the Gospels, he swore "to maintain and defend, to the utmost of his abil-

ity, the rights, liberties, and pre-eminence of this very ancient and opulent city."

We need not trace further the progress of the campaign. If its principal object was to gain possession of Strasburg, and to obtain for France a hold upon the Rhine, it signally failed; for the inhabitants positively refused to admit the royal army, and the King did not deem himself strong enough to treat it otherwise than with extreme courtesy. "As to describing with accuracy the situation and walls of Strasburg," writes the disappointed chronicler whom we have more than once quoted, "I am unable to do it, not having approached within a league of it; for the citizens would permit no one to enter; no, not even to come within a cannon-shot of it. To see it, everybody judged it to be a very beautiful, large, and rich city." Another rich prize, however, awaited the King on his homeward march—the city of Verdun, the third of the "Bishoprics," which Cardinal Lorraine, its spiritual head, succeeded in inducing to open its gates to the French. By these successive acquisitions the power of France had been extended far towards the Rhine. Not only had the French character of the Duchy of Bar been irrevocably fixed; but the frontier was defended by strong outposts, which at the same time secured France and menaced Germany. It was evident that from this time Lorraine must exist only as a dependency of France, and that the incorporation of the remainder, or the ducal portion, could scarcely fail to follow in due time.

The Emperor Charles V. was not slow in understanding the deep wound which had thus been inflicted on the German Empire, and he prepared to forestall its probable consequences by attempting the recovery of the lost ground. Maurice, and the greater part of the Protestants, having succeeded by hard blows in extorting from their unwilling antagonist the concessions, political and religious, which they demanded, entered into the pacification of Passau, which thereafter formed the basis of religious toleration in Germany. In this agreement Henry refused to be included. This was in August, 1552. The next month Charles crossed the Rhine, and in October laid siege to Metz with a well-equipped army

of 60,000 men. If this fell, the other cities would surrender at once, and the way to Paris would be laid open. But the months that had intervened since its capture had not been lost. Instead of the neglected and dilapidated fortifications which the French had found, new and imposing works, capable of an obstinate defence, confronted the Germans, and the city, which was previously destitute alike of sufficient men and of stores, was provisioned for months, and garrisoned by a brave soldiery under command of the intrepid Francis, Duke of Guise. Ambitious nobles of every rank threw themselves into the city, while the flower of the German forces, under the Duke of Alva and the ablest generals Spain could furnish, led in the assault. But in the end the besieged were successful. They repaired by night the breaches made by day. They repulsed the storming parties of the enemy; their sorties made his position insecure; their mines rendered his mines useless. The victims of disease engendered by exposure to rain and cold outnumbered those who were slain by the sword. Before the middle of January, 1553, the fragments of the various corps of the Emperor's army had retreated from before Metz. So pitiful was the plight of many fugitives whom the French overtook on their way back to Germany, that the chronicler tells us the very pursuers were moved with compassion, and allowed them to continue their journey. Many tottered and fell of sheer exhaustion, and at the roadside became the prey of birds and wild beasts.

CONQUEST OF ALSACE.

More than three quarters of a century passed before a fortunate accident threw into the hands of the French the territory along the Rhine, which they had long coveted. Richelieu, after being a spectator of the terrible conflict which has become familiar to us as the "Thirty Years' War," at length resolved to take advantage of an opportunity that might never again arrive, for rendering the Emperor of Germany a less formidable neighbor, as well as for national aggrandizement. For several years, however, the success of the war scarcely answered the expectations of the monarch, who thus far had confined himself

to subsidizing the confederates, and had put no army in the field. Once an invasion of France was carried as far south towards Paris as Soissons, and the capital was terrified with the prospect of a siege. But a few years later the war took another and a more fortunate turn. Duke Bernard of Weimar,—a brilliant strategist, whose untimely death alone prevented him from acquiring and transmitting to posterity the name of one of the first military geniuses of modern times,—finding his native territory in Franconia overrun by the enemy, and himself destitute of troops, and having lost all hope of efficient support from the side of Sweden, resolved to make an arrangement with the intriguing minister of Louis the Thirteenth. It was not difficult to come to terms; for if Bernard was in lack of funds for raising an army, Richelieu was in want of a resolute and skillful leader to counterbalance the influence of Oxenstiern and the Swedes upon the fortunes of Germany. "From a prince like Bernard, who was unable to maintain himself without the assistance of a foreign power," observes Schiller, "France had nothing to apprehend, since even the most fortunate issue would not suffice to place him beyond dependence upon this crown." In the autumn of 1635 the Saxon duke made his appearance at the court, then sojourning at the favorite palace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, where, in October, a compact was entered into between Bernard, no longer as a Swedish general, but in his own name, and the most Christian King. The latter, by this agreement, promised to pay him a pension of 1,500,000 livres for himself, and 4,000,000 for the support of an army which he was to command under the royal authority. The diplomatic dealings of the great are not wont to be characterized by any unusual amount of candor, and it is therefore by no means surprising that in the present engagement each of the "high contracting parties" had fully made up his mind to overreach the other. By a secret article, which Richelieu never intended to fulfill, but which was to incite Bernard to greater zeal in the undertaking, he promised to give all Alsace, when conquered, to the Duke, to be held as a fief from the king of France; while Bernard, not ignorant of the insincerity

of the Cardinal's professions, was equally firmly resolved to retain all that fell into his hands, and to build thereupon, in conjunction with his patrimonial estates, a principality of the first rank.

The work laid out for Bernard he executed to the letter. By the end of 1638 he had conquered not only a very considerable portion of Alsace, but also the district of Brisgau, now forming part of the Grand Duchy of Baden. And on the 18th of December of that year he confirmed his conquests and united the two portions by capturing, at the end of a very remarkable campaign, and after a desperate struggle, the strongly situated town of Brisach, with its bridge across the Rhine. Not inferior to his own joy at his success in making himself master of this critical point, was the exultation of Cardinal Richelieu. It was when the tidings of the victory reached the French court, that that dramatic incident occurred which historians have been fond of narrating. Father Joseph du Tremblai was dying—"the faithful, indefatigable agent, inexhaustible in expedients and resources, who, without title and without official character, had served Richelieu more effectually than all the Secretaries of State with portfolios." "Take heart, Father Joseph," cried the Cardinal, almost beside himself with delight, in the ears of the dying man, "Take heart, Brisach is ours!" But the triumph, which at another time would have kindled his enthusiasm, only brought a momentary expression of satisfaction on the face of one for whom the things of this life were fast fading out of sight. Not so with the Cardinal. "Already," says the historian of the Thirty Years' War, "he had in thought swallowed up Alsace, Brisgau, and all the Austrian possessions nearest France, without remembering the promise which he had made to Duke Bernard. The resolute determination of the latter to retain Brisach for himself, to which he gave no doubtful expression, threw the Cardinal into no slight embarrassment, and every device was resorted to in order to retain the victorious Bernard in the French interest. He was invited to court, to be a witness of the honor with which the memory of his triumphs was celebrated: Ber-

nard saw the snare, and avoided it. The honor was shown him of offering him a niece of the Cardinal's in marriage: the noble Prince of the Empire rejected her, that he might not dishonor his Saxon blood by a *mésalliance*. And now he began to be regarded as a dangerous enemy, and to be treated as such. The funds for his subsidy were withheld. The governor of Brisach and his principal officers were corrupted, in order, at least after the Duke's death, to secure possession of his conquests and of his troops." Thus were the seeds of distrust sown, and the prospect of further and more glorious triumphs was inconsiderately cut off. The loss of the material support which France had pledged herself to give him, and the necessity to which he was driven to divide his forces and leave garrisons in the cities he had captured, rather to prevent a surprise from the French than an open attack by the enemy, paralyzed the military energies of Bernard. Yet, although delayed in the execution of his plans, he was about to enter upon a magnificent scheme of warfare, striking at the Danube and the very heart of the power of the Austrian house, when a sudden death snatched him away (July, 1639) in the thirty-sixth year of his age, and "in the midst of his heroic course."

It was well for the reputation of his enemies that four hundred others died in the camp, within the course of a couple of days, of the same disease, or the suspicion of his having been poisoned would have gained general currency; so opportune for the Imperialists was the death of "the greatest general whom the Allies had possessed since Gustavus Adolphus," as the historian Schiller well denominates Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar—"standing in modern history as an illustrious representative of those vigorous times when personal greatness still accomplished something, when bravery won kingdoms, and heroic valor could conduct a German knight even to the Imperial throne."

Bernard's death was turned to good advantage by France. Both his victorious army and his conquests in Alsace fell to her share. The Duke had indeed bequeathed both to his brother William; and for the army there were still other competitors—the Count Palatine,

Sweden, and even the Empire itself. But France was prompt, energetic, and, which was still more important, lavish of bribes. And as William felt himself by no means sufficiently powerful to throw down the gauntlet to the emperor in behalf of Alsace, that province fell without a struggle into the hands of Louis the Thirteenth.

In the treaty of Westphalia (October 24th, 1648) the new acquisitions of France were definitely secured to her. The Empire now, for the first time, formally renounced the sovereignty of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which for ninety-six years had been in the possession of France. The landgraviate of Upper and Lower Alsace, Brisach, the Sundgau, the prefecture of the ten imperial cities of Alsace (Haguenau, Colmar, Weissemburg, etc.) were to be incorporated in France. Several important fortresses, such as that of Saverne, were to be dismantled; while Saverne, Mulhausen, and, above all, Strasburg, were to remain independent, or to belong to their former masters.

STRASBURG.

Yet even after the conquests that had extended their dominion to the banks of the Rhine, the ambition of the French monarchs was far from satisfied. Both in the neighborhood of Metz and in Alsace the boundary line of the realm was irregular and tortuous. Minor fiefs of the German Empire broke in upon its continuity. The territories of feudal lords and of free cities were to be found quite enclosed in those of the King, yet altogether independent of them. The very security of Louis's conquests was endangered. The upper Rhine could not be guarded without the possession of the strong city of Strasburg, which served as a kind of "*tête de pont*" by which the Germans could at any time throw an army into France. Even before Alsace became theirs, the French had cast envious glances in this direction. "From the moment Metz was gained they dreamed of Strasburg." And now the time came when, without any just or equitable grounds, the seizure could be made with impunity. The method resorted to was worthy of the un-

scrupulous government with which it originated.

The peace of Nimeguen, in 1678, not only augmented the extent of Louis the Fourteenth's kingdom by the cession on the part of Spain of important territories, such as Franche-Comté, and a strip along the southern side of Flanders, but left him almost in the position of an absolute master of the destinies of the western part of Europe. Of his late antagonists there was no one that stood ready to resent any further act of aggression, much less to oppose by force of arms any legal construction which he might put upon the terms of the recent treaties. "Peace," says a distinguished historian of our times, "had been made upon the conditions which Louis fixed by his letter of April 9th, 1678. The Academy of Inscriptions could without hyperbole write upon the medal struck in its honor, that the peace had been concluded according to the laws dictated by the King (*Pace in leges suas confecta*)." In confirming to France the peaceable possession of the "Three Bishoprics," and of Alsace, the late pacifications were so worded as to include the dependencies of the fiefs thus acquired. Taking advantage of this phraseology, the sophists of the court suggested the erection of a new species of tribunal or commission—*Chambres de Réunion*, as they were designated—whose sole function should be to make research as to what lands, not yet in actual possession of the King, had at some time or other belonged to, or been dependent upon, the recent conquests of his armies. It must be admitted that the field of investigation was sufficiently broad and promising, and that as the explorers were to push their inquiries as far back as the time of the Merovingians, there was little likelihood that any desirable districts would escape their notice or the King's rapacity:

The plan was put into execution as early as in 1679, and by the second day of the next year the Chamber for Alsace was ready to report progress. It was not long before the Archbishop Elector of Trèves, the Elector Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse, the King of Sweden, and other princes, temporal and spiritual, received an unexpected and

somewhat startling summons to do homage to Louis for various small fiefs which they held embedded in French territory or in convenient proximity to it. "Most of the towns and villages of these cantons," says Henri Martin, "had once depended on the Abbey of Weissemburg, founded by King Dagobert, and were incapable, it was asserted, of being alienated, the imperial constitutions having proclaimed the property of the Church to be inalienable. The claim would have been simply ludicrous (*eût tourné au burlesque*), if under these false reasons there had not lurked something serious and profound, namely, the claiming by France of the old Gallic soil." The whole of the year 1680 was taken up with the publication and execution of decrees of this kind. The Chamber of Metz gathered in upwards of eighty fiefs, said to have been dependent on the "Three Bishoprics," and among them some places whose names have lately come to be in the mouths of everybody, — Pont-à-Mousson, Saarbruck, Bitsch, etc.

Strasburg was one of the principal objects aimed at. First her homage for her lands in Alsace was demanded, and the free Imperial city, which had never admitted such a claim on the part of the Emperors themselves, felt herself too feeble to refuse. Not content with this, the French made the city itself the field of intrigue. Money paved the way for violence. Long had there been a party within the walls ready to welcome the advent of the King's forces. It was the adherents of the titular bishop, who desired to see the predominance of the Roman Catholic religion restored. But this clique was of itself impotent to accomplish its object. French agents, therefore, approached the municipal government, and by bribes succeeded in shaking their loyalty. The German troops had been previously removed; now the Swiss guards were dismissed. At a mere suggestion from the French government, the treacherous guardians of the city's liberties ordered the demolition of an important fort. When Strasburg had thus been deprived of all means of successful defence the blow was struck. Late in September, 1681, a rendezvous was secretly given to the French troops in the adjoining provinces — Lorraine, Franche-Comté, and

Alsace—before the walls of the devoted place. On the 28th of the month not less than 35,000 men were discovered in close proximity to Strasburg—a force that cut off all communication with the Rhine and with Germany, and that rendered any attempt at resistance futile. Nor were the citizens long left in doubt respecting the King's intentions. General Montclar, who commanded the new-comers, demanded the instant recognition of his master's sovereignty and the admission of a garrison of French soldiers. But while thus insisting upon the full rights adjudged to him by the Chamber of Reunion, Louis was willing, he said, to secure to the inhabitants all the privileges and immunities they had enjoyed under the Empire. There was no time for delay, and no power of resistance. The unfaithful magistrates decently made a show of yielding to compulsion, and wrote to justify their action in the Emperor's eyes; but as they had conveniently left the guns on the walls unprovided with powder, the people had no means of preventing the consummation of the transaction. So, after a short struggle, Strasburg capitulated on the 30th of September. The city was to retain its municipal institutions, and its ecclesiastical and political privileges. It was only stipulated that the magnificent cathedral, that prodigy of mediæval architecture, should be restored to the Roman Catholics—a reward to the bishop and the chapter, who had been prime movers in the work of annexation.

"Thus," writes an eminent historian, to whom we have before referred, "was reunited to our native land, without the effusion of blood, that illustrious city which had never been taken before it became French, and which has never been taken since it has belonged to France." On the 23d of October, 1681, Louis made his triumphant entry into Strasburg. The pompous ceremonial over, that consummate master of the art of fortification, Vauban, was summoned to remodel and strengthen the entire system of the defences, at whose completion a medal was struck with the motto, "*Clausæ Germanis Gallia*" ("France closed to the Germans").

The chief losers by the transfer of Strasburg to France were the Protestants. The

inhabitants of the Imperial city had been among the first to embrace the faith of the Reformation. One hundred and fifty-two years before, on the 19th of April, 1529, the representatives of Strasburg had stood with the Elector of Saxony and other princes and cities of the Empire in the Diet of Spire, and handed in that famous "*Protest*," from which first the Lutherans, and afterwards all branches of the regenerated Church, had received the appellation of Protestants. For over a score of years no other worship than that of the Lutheran Church was tolerated. So strong was the anti-papal feeling that when, in 1549 or 1550, the priests were once more allowed to chant Mass in one of the three churches that were assigned them, the rabble interrupted the service with noise and coarse jests, and the officiating Bishop and his clergy in needless trepidation took refuge in the neighboring town of Saverne. It was not until the Emperor gave the Bishop an express command to resume his functions that he returned; and the magistrates, by distributing themselves through the church, were able to maintain some degree of decorum. It was natural that the Bishop and his party should be jubilant, and that the capture of Strasburg should have been the beginning of a system of proselytism, in prosecuting which some would have been glad to see the "*dragonnades*" of Louis's hereditary dominions extended to the new acquisition. Louis himself boasted of his successful stratagem as a triumph of the faith. On one of the medals which he caused to be struck to commemorate the event, may yet be read the legend: "*Sacra restituta*" ("Religion restored"), while below sits the city of Strasburg, represented by a woman, near the river-god Rhine, and holding a bundle of rods surmounted by a palm and by a cross. Upon another medal, of elegant workmanship and of the same date (1681), the book of justice is seen in one scale of a balance outweighing the sword laid in the other, and in the distance the city of Strasburg, with its beautiful cathedral. With the history of the conquest before us, we shall scarcely be able to agree in the truth of the motto that runs around the representation and explains its significance: "*Non ferro sed*



jure redacta," ("Acquired not by the sword, but by right!")

ANNEXATION OF LORRAINE.

While the King of France had been pushing his conquests to the very banks of the Rhine, and incorporating with his hereditary estates a wide extent of territory inhabited by a population exclusively German in character and language, and estranged as well in religion as in manners from the greater part of his subjects, there yet remained far nearer to the heart of the country, and in a manner enclosed in it, a district much more naturally belonging to the French monarchy. We refer to Lorraine proper, which still continued to be governed by the independent dukes whose capital was Nancy, and who, although doing homage to France for the connected duchy of Bar, and represented in the Diet for the eastern part of their dominions, were nevertheless esteemed a sovereign house but little inferior to those of the more powerful monarchies of Western Europe. In fact, to several of the royal families, that of Lorraine was already closely allied by marriage. More than once the duchy of Lorraine had, it is true, narrowly escaped being swallowed up in the neighboring States; and it had owed its continued existence rather to the forbearance than to the fears of its neighbors, or, it may be, rather to the insignificance of its influence upon the destinies of Europe than to any disturbance of equilibrium which its removal might have occasioned. But unimportant as was Lor-

raine in itself, it was a province essential to France. With the view of preparing the way for its ultimate acquisition, Henry the Fourth, from the very commencement of his reign, had made strenuous efforts to shake the union between the dukes and that younger branch of their family which had gained such unenviable notoriety in France—the Guises. His agents had labored, not without success, to render the Lorraine princes lukewarm in espousing the claims of Mayenne upon the crown that had fallen from the head of the Valois. Claude, the daughter of Henry the Second and Catharine de Medici, who had married Duke Charles the Third, had died in 1575; and Henry the Fourth had no hesitation in offering the aged widower the hand of his own sister, the virtuous princess Catharine of Bourbon. Sully has given a long list of the matrimonial projects that were made at various times for this lady, who now had the additional adventure, after having been offered to the old Duke, of being actually given in marriage to his son Henry, the Duke of Bar. The union was not a happy one. Not only was there no real sympathy between husband and wife, but there was the utmost diversity of religious sentiment. Catharine, true daughter of Jeanne d'Albret, was a devoted Protestant. Her mother, with wise foresight, had in



her will enjoined upon her son to marry his sister to some prince of similar faith. But Henry, in deserting his mother's religion in search of worldly advantage, had deemed it

equally politic to neglect the fulfillment of her dying request. It was not the only time that history vindicated the superior wisdom, as well as the superior principle, of the Navarrese queen, who, to use an old writer's expression, "had of woman nothing but the sex."

In 1661 the ducal crown of Lorraine rested on the head of Charles the Fourth, an aged and childless libertine, who entertained the liveliest jealousy of his brother Francis, and of his son, subsequently Charles the Fifth. Among other grounds for this distrust was the circumstance that if, as was generally supposed, the Salic law, confining the succession to males, did not prevail in Lorraine, his nephew had a valid title to the crown by right of his mother. An unscrupulous agent of Louis the Fourteenth, M. de Lionne, applied himself to fanning the flame of discord, and at length induced the Duke of Lorraine, on the 6th of February, 1662, to sign a compact, known as the Act of Montmartre, by which he formally ceded all his territorial possessions to the King of France in case he died without legitimate children. In return, the King conferred upon him a yearly pension of a million livres, and recognized the princes of Lorraine as princes of the blood, with a right to succeed to the throne of France in case of the extinction of the Bourbon line. The city of Marsal, the only place in Lorraine which, according to the arrangements of the previous year, had not been dismantled, was to be put in Louis's hands as a pledge for the fulfillment of the terms of the agreement. It may readily be imagined that the iniquitous document, when it came to be known, struck consternation into the minds of the legitimate heirs to the duchy. In vain did they remonstrate with Louis against his attempting to put so unjust an arrangement into execution. The monarch coolly informed them that the ordinary laws of morality were not binding upon monarchs when offset by the requirements of political expediency. Fortunately, there were others discontented with the plan, and none more so than the French nobility, who would not brook the exaltation of the foreign family of Lorraine to a rank so far superior to themselves, conferring upon them a distant, but none the less an actual, prospect of at some

time succeeding to the crown royal. On this ground, in answer to numerous protests, the Parliament of Paris, whilst it registered the act, did so with the express refusal to confirm this essential condition. Nor was this astonishing. Had the judges done differently, they would virtually have recognized the old pretension which the younger Lorraines of the previous century had put forth, that they were the lineal descendants of Charlemagne and the Carolingian kings, while the Valois and Bourbon families were sprung from the usurper and upstart Hugh Capet, Count of Paris. As the heirs of the Duke refused to ratify the compact of Montmartre, Louis did not insist upon the stipulation for their recognition as princes of the blood. All which furnished Duke Charles (who had repented the hasty bargain, and had indeed fallen madly in love with a girl of low birth, the niece of an apothecary, whom he desired to marry) with an extraordinarily good excuse for revoking his consent, and refusing to surrender the town of Marsal. With so powerful a trader as Louis, it was not very safe to refuse to pay the contracted price, even if the goods that were to be delivered as the equivalent were withheld. Accordingly the "grand monarch" set on foot a military expedition, which must have been looked upon in the court rather as a very pleasant comedy than as intended for a real campaign. And so it proved. Without bloodshed, but under very sensible compulsion, the Duke signed a second treaty at Metz, September 1st, 1663, by which he gave up Marsal to its fate; while Louis, who perhaps looked upon the duchy as an unripe fruit which could indeed be plucked at once, but which if allowed to remain a little longer would fall into the hand of its own accord, was content to make no mention of its cession, and so, in effect, to abrogate the provisions of the untimely compact of Montmartre.

But we must hasten on to the consummation of the union, which confessedly could not be long deferred. We take no account of the overrunning of Lorraine by the troops of Louis the Fourteenth, later in the seventeenth century, as the occupation led to no permanent results. Not so, however, was it with the diplomatic intrigues of the succeeding century.

These connect themselves with the remarkable history of that puppet of fortune, Stanislas Leszcynski. Rarely have more singular alternations of success and failure attended the course of any man. The son of the Palatine of Posen, he was early raised by the King of Poland, Augustus the Second, to the post of arch-butler. Being subsequently sent on a diplomatic mission to Charles the Twelfth of Sweden, he so ingratiated himself with that monarch that the latter employed all his influence to obtain his election to the throne of Poland. As the Swedish king's words were vigorously supported by his victorious sword, Augustus was dethroned, and Stanislas, then twenty-seven years of age, succeeded him. This was in 1704. Eight years later he was himself compelled to abdicate and flee from the kingdom. Next we find him a prisoner with the Turks, and a little later a governor in the service of his former protector. When Charles died, his star seemed again to have sunk; and in obscurity, and almost in destitution, he sought a refuge in France. While thus exiled, and living at Weissemburg upon the pension which the regency of Louis the Fifteenth had compassionately granted him, he was amazed by the proposals which were unexpectedly made to him in the name of that king for the hand of his only daughter, Maria Leszcynska. If we may believe the writers of that day, it was not the personal attractions of the young lady, much less any accession of strength that would accrue to France from the alliance with the broken-down ex-King of Poland, that led Cardinal Fleury to advocate the match; but rather the desire to unite his master to a queen who should owe her position solely to him, and who would, consequently, be unlikely to make any attempt at interference in the political administration. At all events, the marriage, which took place in 1725, again raised Stanislas to notoriety; and although in giving his daughter away he had expressly renounced all claims to the Polish crown, when his old rival Augustus died, in 1733, he found himself in a position to assert his rights, and obtained their confirmation by the votes of the people. The needless war in which France was plunged to support him, we shall not stop to describe. It is sufficient to say

that while, through the inefficiency of the government, Stanislas failed to maintain himself upon the throne, he received at the conclusion of peace, by way of indemnification, a sovereignty which, if less extensive, was perhaps more agreeable, from its nearness to his daughter's residence.

By the preliminary articles of Vienna, signed October 5th, 1735, the Emperor of Germany consented that the young Duke Francis of Lorraine, who was to marry his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, should exchange the Duchies of Lorraine and of Bar for the reversion of the Grand-Duchy of Tuscany. Stanislas was at once to enter into possession of the Duchy of Bar, and Lorraine was to fall to him as soon as Francis obtained Tuscany. On the death of Stanislas both Bar and Lorraine were to become an integral part of France.

For this arrangement, by which Lorraine would be lost to Germany, the Emperor promised to employ his influence to secure the consent of the States of the Empire, while Louis and Stanislas renounced the representation of Lorraine in the Diet. The death of the last Medicean Duke of Tuscany rendered the execution of the compact even more speedy than had been anticipated, and for thirty years Stanislas retained undisputed possession of the province which he had obtained in so singular a manner. When he died, in 1766, Lorraine was annexed to France without creating the least disturbance in the

politics of Europe; so long had the act been expected, both at home and abroad.

By the annexation of ducal Lorraine, the conquest begun more than two centuries before, in the occupation of "the Three Bishoprics," and continued by the reduction of Alsace and the seizure of Strasburg, was brought to a definite conclusion. Franche-Comté had in the mean while been overrun by the troops of Louis the Fourteenth, and surrendered by Spain in the Treaty of Nimeguen in 1678. Thus the entire triangle which was wanting to France in the age of Francis the First had been gained, and from the ocean to the Rhine her dominions were unbroken.

All these acquisitions on the part of France had been ratified by conventions and treaties with Germany. Nevertheless, when the French Revolution broke out, and the proclamation of the equality of all citizens in the eye of the law was accompanied by the abolition of all titles of nobility, and by the destruction of feudal tenures, the Empire and its allies found a pretext for interference in the case of a number of German princes who were thus deprived of fiefs which they claimed to hold in Alsace and Lorraine. In the war of 1792, which arose ostensibly from this source, there were in reality other and more influential motives; and the restoration of the forfeited fiefs was more and more lost sight of, as the fierce contest for national existence and territorial aggrandizement waxed from year to year more intense.